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THE SCIENCE CHARADE IN SPECIES CONSERVATION

Jonathan H. Adler *

INTRODUCTION

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is among the nation’s most important and powerful
environmental laws. It is also a source of great conflict and controversy. 1 The listing of
individual species, the designation of critical habitat and the implementation of conservation
measures often prompt fierce legal and political battles. In these conflicts, activists on all sides
claim that “sound science” supports their respective positions, and scoff at the “junk science”
relied upon by the other side. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service fails to rely upon the best
science, critics claim. 2 If it did, they charge, it would adopt policies more to their liking.

*

Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law; Senior Fellow, Property & Environment Research Center. This paper was
prepared for the Searle Civil Justice Institute Research Roundtable on Judicial Review of Regulatory Evidence at the
Law & Economics Center at the Antonin Scalia Law School, November 15-16, 2016. The author thanks J.B. Ruhl
for his comments. All errors, omissions, or inanities are solely the fault of the author.

1

See, e.g., Michael J. Bean, The Endangered Species Act: Science, Policy, and Politics, 1162 ANNALS THE N.Y.
ACAD. OF SCI. 369 (2009) (noting the ESA “is one of the most contentious of our federal environmental laws.”).
2

See Dennis D. Murphy & Pail S. Weiland, Guidance on the Use of Best Available Science under the U.S.
Endangered Species Act, 58 ENVTL. MGMT. 1, 1 (2016) (“it is commonly alleged that the federal wildlife agencies
charged with administration of the ESA fail to meet” the “best available science” standard). See also M. Lynne
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The debate over the use of science under the ESA is part of the “science charade” that
clouds substantive policy debate about species conservation. 3 What typically divides competing
interest groups is not a devotion to science, but sharply divergent policy preferences dressed up
in scientific garb. The political debate over the use of science under the ESA tends to obscure
the dividing line between science and policy and undermines the development of more effective
and equitable conservation strategies. Further, efforts to reform the ESA by mandating additional
scientific procedures or increasing judicial scrutiny of the use of science by federal agencies will
do little to address the ESA’s underlying problems or make species conservation efforts more
effective.
Scientific research is necessary to inform species conservation decisions. But species
conservation is not – and cannot be – a wholly scientific exercise. Judgments about what
constitutes a distinct species or how to evaluate incomplete scientific data necessarily draw upon
normative premises. More significantly, policy decisions about what sorts of conservation
measures should be adopted are not scientific at all. Whether habitat loss will reduce the
likelihood that a given species or population will survive in the wild may be a scientific question,
but what measures should be adopted to conserve such habitat, and at what cost, is a normative
policy judgment. Science can – indeed, must – inform such inquiries, but science cannot tell us
what to do. Engaging in the “science charade,” either by pretending that ESA implementation
may be guided by scientific judgment alone or by claiming that reforms of how science is used is

Corn, Kristina Alexander, & Eugene H. Buck, Cong. Res. Serv,.The Endangered Species Act and “Sound Science,”
Congressional Research Service (Jan. 23, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32992.pdf.
3

On the “science charade,” see Wendy Wagner, the Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613 (1995).
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unlikely to improve species conservation. To the contrary, efforts to constrain or control the use
of science in ESA listing decisions or enhance judicial review of agency scientific
determinations will undermine the quality and reliability of ESA science and lead to less
effective conservation policy.
Whatever ails the ESA, a failure to incorporate adequate science is not the cause of the
disease. As this Article explains, efforts to augment the amount or type of science used in ESA
decision-making, whether through additional procedural mandates or altered standards of judicial
review, will not address the conflicts that afflict species conservation policy. In some cases, such
measures could further undermine the ESA’s ability to conserve species.
Part I of the Article gives a brief overview of the ESA, its operation, and the scientific
requirements written into the Act. Part II describes the “science charade,” through which
policymakers and others pretend that policy judgments are purely scientific questions, and the
legal and political incentives that ensure this artifice persists. Part III details how the ESA’s
structure generates political pressure on the use of science and encourages the science charade in
species conservation. Part IV explains why various “sound science” reforms will not address
these problems, and Part V outlines alternative policy reforms.

I.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
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Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 to conserve and protect animal and plant species
threatened with extinction and the ecosystems upon which they depend. 4 Building upon prior
statutes enacted in the 1960s, 5 the ESA creates a mechanism to identify those species in need of
protection and imposes regulatory constraints on activities that may pose a threat to identified
species and he habitat on which they depend. The statute is a “blunt” 6 yet powerful
environmental law. 7
The Act imposes significant regulatory constraints on economic activities that may harm
endangered species. 8 Under Section 7, federal agencies are required to consult with the Fish and

4

See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species . . .”).

5

See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better
Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1049 (1997) (summarizing ways in which the ESA built upon, and departed from,
prior species conservation statutes).

6

See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion Over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
490, 493 (2008) (“The ESA was set up to protect imperiled biodiversity in a straightforward, but blunt, way whose
consequences were not appreciated in the 1970s”).
7

It has become almost cliché to note that the ESA has been characterized as the “pitbull” of environmental law. As
Donald Barry, then of the World Wildlife Fund explained: “It’s short, compact and has a hell of a set of teeth.
Because of its teeth, the act can force people to make the kind of tough political decisions they wouldn't normally
make.” See Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environment Law May Become Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 1992. Cf. Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 506 (“the ESA may in reality be a paper tiger given the extent to
which it is not enforced in many cases”).
8

Although most of the activities regulated by the ESA are economic in nature, courts have held that the ESA may
reach non-economic activities as well. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2017) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to regulation under the ESA);
accord Markle Interests, L.L.C. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016); San Luis & Delta–
Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011); Ala.–Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d 1250 (11th
Cir. 2007); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003); Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d
1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1997). For an argument that the regulation of non-economic activity that threatens species
may exceed the scope of the federal government’s Commerce Clause power, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial
Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 406-17 (2005). See also
Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the Endangered Species Act Constitutional under the Commerce
Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375 (2007).
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Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service to ensure that no action “authorized,
funded, or carried out” by that agency will “jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species” or destroy or degrade critical habitat for such species. 9
Section 9 prohibits the unpermitted “taking” of any endangered species, by anyone. 10 Violators
are subject to civil and criminal penalties. 11 As defined in the Act, “taking” an endangered
species not only includes killing, wounding, or capturing an endangered species, but also
otherwise harming the species, including by destroying or adversely modifying its habitat. 12
Section 10 provides for the granting of “incidental take permits” to authorize activities that
would be otherwise prohibited under Section 9. 13
The trigger for the Act’s regulatory provisions is the listing of a species. 14 Under Section
4, the Secretary of the Interior to identify and list those species that are “endangered” or

9

16 U.S.C. §1536.

10

16 U.S.C. §1538.

11

See 16 U.S.C. § 1540.

12

See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).

13

See 16 U.S.C. § 1539.

14

See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Politics and Science in Endangered Species Act Listing Decisions, in INSTITUTIONS
101 (Jason Scott Johnston ed. 2012) (“Under the existing ESA, the
decision to list a species has high stakes because listing is the gateway to the potentially significant federal
protections that the Act provides.”).

AND INCENTIVES IN REGULATORY SCIENCE
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“threatened.” 15 Once a species is listed, the Act directs the Secretary to designate “critical
habitat” for the species 16 and to develop a “recovery plan” to ensure the species’ survival. 17
The ESA defines “endangered species” as “any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 18 A “threatened species,” by contrast, is
defined as “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” 19 A “species” need not be an actual
species, however. Rather, the ESA defines “species” is defined to include “any subspecies of fish
or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or
wildlife which interbreeds when mature.” 20
As of May 2017, there were 2,320 species on the endangered and threatened species
lists.21 Of listed species, 1,653 are domestic and 675 are foreign. 22 1,862 species are listed as

15
See16 U.S.C. § 1533(a). Responsibility for determining the status of some marine species is assigned to the
Secretary of Commerce. The Interior Secretary and the Commerce Secretary have delegated their responsibilities
under these provisions to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS
aka NOAA Fisheries), respectively. Id. As a practical matter, FWS is responsible for implementing the ESA in most
circumstances, as NMFS is responsible for only a small fraction of listed species.
16

See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A).

17

See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).

18

See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).

19

See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).

20

See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). In addition, the Act exempts from those species eligible for to be listed “species of the
Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this chapter
would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.” See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).

21

See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Listed Species Summary (Box Score) https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/boxscore-report (site visited May 22, 2017).

22

Id.
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endangered. 466 species are listed as threatened. 23 Although the FWS is authorized to list species
on its own initiative, most species listings are the result of petitions filed by researchers or
environmentalist groups, and many are the result of litigation. 24
Under Section 4, listing determinations are to be made “solely on the basis of the best
scientific and commercial data available” 25 This formulation is not unique to the ESA, 26 and is
based upon language from earlier federal species conservation statutes. 27 Because the standard
focuses on what information and analysis is “available” it does not require that the data relied
upon by the agency surpass any particularly quantitative or qualitative threshold. 28 The Act does,

23

Id.

24
See Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 496-97. Insofar as litigation s used to drive listing decisions, it
threatens to divert resources away from conservation efforts the FWS would have otherwise prioritized. As
Professor Wyman explains, “the FWS has lost control over the listing process as decisions about whether to list
species are largely made in response to citizen petitions for listing and litigation.” Id. at 496. This is a significant
problem for species conservation efforts.
25

See 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(1).
The Secretary shall make determinations required by subsection (a)(1) solely on the basis of the best
scientific and commercial data available to him after conducting a review of the status of the species and
after taking into account those efforts, if any, being made by any State or foreign nation, or any political
subdivision of a State or foreign nation, to protect such species, whether by predator control, protection of
habitat and food supply, or other conservation practices, within any area under its jurisdiction; or on the
high seas.

26

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1041-47 (surveying use of similar formulation in various conservation
statutes).

27

As originally enacted, 16 U.S.C. §1533 required listing decisions to be made “on the basis of the best scientific
and commercial data available.” Pub. L. No. 93-205, §4(b)(1), 87 Stat. 884 (1973). The word “solely” was added in
1982. See Pub. L. No. 97-304, §2(a)(2), 96 Stat. 411 (1982). This revision was made to prevent the government
relying upon “non-biological” considerations, such as economic impact analyses. See Doremus, Listing, supra note
__, at 1055.
28

In the case of petitions to list (or delist) a species, however, the Secretary is only required to review a species’
status and make a listing (or delisting) determination if the Secretary determines the petition “presents substantial
scientific or commercial information” in support of the petitioned action. See 16 U.S.C. §1333(b)(3)(a).
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however, identify a series of factors to consider in assessing risks to species. 29 Once a species is
listed, critical habitat designations must also be based upon the “best scientific data available,”
though the Secretary is also required to consider potential economic and other impacts of such
designations. 30
The ESA’s “best available” science requirement “rests on the assumption that
conservation policy decisions can be made objectively on the basis of existing or reasonably
attainable scientific knowledge.” 31 While listing decisions must be made on the “best available
science,” the Act does not specify the extent to which predicate determinations, such as what
constitutes a species, must also be made exclusively on a scientific basis. 32 The terms
“endangered” and “threatened,” although defined in the act, also lack and scientifically defined
parameters. 33

29
Under 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(1), in analyzing whether a species is endangered or threatened, the Secretary must
determine whether the risk to the species is “because of any of the following factors:

(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.”
30

See 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(2) (providing that critical habitat designations are to be made “on the basis of the best
scientific data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on national security, and
any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.”).

31

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1056.

32

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1095.

33

See infra
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As of May 2017, the FWS had delisted 78 species, subspecies, and species populations
under the ESA. 34 Of these, ten were delisted due to extinction, and nineteen were delisted due to
a taxonomic or data error. 35 Of the remaining 47 –those the FWS identifies as “recovered” -some of these represent not distinct species, but distinct populations of a given species. For
instance, the FWS delisting report separately lists nine populations of humpback whale
(Megaptera novaeangliae), accounting for nearly one-fifth of species “recovered” by the Act. 36
The fact that species are occasionally delisted because of data errors or a need to revise
taxonomic determinations highlights the fact that species are necessarily listed based upon
incomplete knowledge. 37 When the Tennessee snail darter was discovered in Tennessee’s Tellico
River, researchers understandably assumed that the small fresh-water fish was quite rare. After
all, it had not been discovered before. The snail darter was subsequently listed and prompted the
litigation that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 38 Years
later, after the litigation had concluded (and Congress exempted the TVA’s Tellico Dam from
the Act’s requirements), additional populations of the snail darter were discovered and it was
“downlisted” from “endangered” to “threatened.” 39

34

See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, “Delisted Species,” https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/delisting-report (visited
May 15, 2017). This site is regularly updated as delisting decisions are made.

35

A taxonomic or data error means that some of the assumptions made when a species was first listed turned out to
be inaccurate.
36

See USFWS, “Delisted Species,” supra note __.

37

See Murphy & Weiland, supra note __, at 5.

38

437 U.S. 153 (1978).

39

See Final Rule Reclassifying the Snail Darter (Percina Tanasi) From an Endangered Species to a Threatened
Species, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,510 (1984); see also CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE 173
(1995).
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The relatively small number of delisted species – and the even smaller number of those
species the FWS deems “recovered” – is the basis for substantial criticism of the Act. 40 The
ESA’s stated goal of recovering species from the brink of extinction “has been reached in
distressingly few cases.” 41 To some (including this author), the ESA can hardly be deemed a
success if only two percent of listed species have been recovered in the past forty-some years. 42
Others argue that the focus on recoveries is misplaced, however, as the real measure of the
ESA’s success is the even smaller number of extinctions. 43 In this view, the ESA may not be
nursing endangered populations back to health, but it is preventing them from going extinct. 44
A 2007 study found that listing a species does not appear to lead to an improvement in
that species’ status. 45 To the contrary, this study found that listing a species can actually be
detrimental if the listing is not followed with significant funding on species recovery. 46 As the

40

See Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __ at 494-95. For this author’s critique, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Leaky
Ark: The Failure of Endangered Species Regulation on Private Land, in REBUILDING THE ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2011).
41

Joe Kerkvliet & Christian Langpap, Learning from Endangered and Threatened Species Recovery Programs: A
Case Study Using U.S. Endangered Species Act Recovery Scores, 63 ECOL. ECON. 499, 500 (2007).

42
The record may be even worse in that it is not clear how much credit the ESA deserves for some of these
recoveries. See Adler, Leaky, supra note __, at 10.
43

See, e.g., Krishna Gifford, Measuring Recovery Success, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULLETIN (Sept. 2007) at 4
(“counting only the number of recovery related delistings does not give a true measure of the Act’s success”).
44

See, e.g., J. Michael Scott, et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, VOLUME 1:
RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 31 (Dale D. Goble, J. Michael Scott, & Frank W. Davis eds., 2006)
(estimating that the ESA saved over 200 species from extinction in thirty years); see also Martin F. J. Taylor, Kieran
F. Suckling, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative Analysis, 55
BIOSCIENCE 365 (2005) (finding that the longer a species is listed, the more likely it is to have an improving status).
45

See Paul J. Ferraro, Craig McIntosh, and Monica Opsina, The Effectiveness of the U.S. Endangered Species Act:
An Econometric Analysis Using Matching Methods, 54 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 245 (2007).

46

Id. at 246:
Our results indicate that success can be achieved when the ESA is combined with substantial speciesspecific spending, but listing in the absence of funding appears to have adverse consequences for species
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authors explained: “Our analysis suggests that it is not the act of listing itself that matters, but
rather high levels of expenditures for recovery combined with listing. Simply listing a species in
the absence of such expenditures appears to lead to a decline.” 47 Other studies seem to support
the conclusion that spending on species conservation is more important than listing. 48 One
problem with all such analyses, however, is that they tend to be based upon FWS assessments of
species status, and such assessments are anything but scientific. As one set of researchers
concluded, FWS assessments are somewhat subjective, lack transparent criteria, and “may be
manipulated to achieve agency objectives.” 49

II.

THE SCIENCE CHARADE

The debate over the use of science under the ESA provides a textbook example of what
Professor Wendy Wagner characterized as the “science charade.” 50 In an influential 1995 article,
Wagner diagnosed “a pervasive ‘science charade,’ where agencies exaggerate the contributions
made by science in setting toxic standards in order to avoid accountability for the underlying

recovery. This implies that using scarce conservation funding in the contentious process of listing a species
may be less effective than using this funding to promote recovery directly.
47

Id.

48

See, e.g., Kerkvleit & Langpap, supra note __. See also Adler, Leaky, supra note __, at 12-14.

49

See Ferraro, McIntosh & Ospina, supra note __, at 247.

50

See Wendy Wagner, the Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
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policy decisions.” 51 As Wagner detailed, “camouflaging controversial policy decisions as
science” enables government agencies to evade political and legal accountability. 52
Many science-related policy questions – such as the precise level at which exposure to a
chemical may pose a health risk, let alone the exposure level that should be proscribed under law
– cannot be answered solely by reference to scientific research. Contemporary research rarely, if
ever, is sufficiently comprehensive to answer relevant scientific questions with complete
certainty. Yet because such questions necessarily implicate and rely upon scientific analysis,
such questions are perceived as “scientific” by observers, particularly the lay public. This occurs,
in part, because science “appears to be shielded from the evils of politics” and thus offers a
seemingly “objective” basis for policy decisions. 53 Scientists themselves sometimes act in ways
to further this misimpression. 54 As Professor Holly Doremus notes, “characterizing a decision as
strictly scientific can allow politicians to evade difficult value choices, placing those choices
instead in the hands of technical experts.” 55
Emphasizing, or indeed exaggerating, the role science plays in any given agency decision
can also help insulate agency actions from judicial review. 56 Courts have long been wary of

51

Wagner, supra note __, at 1617.

52

Wagner, supra note __, at 1617.

53

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1038.

54

On the potential roles of scientists in the policy process, see ROGER PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING
SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND POLITICS (2003). On policy advocacy by scientists, see Robert t. Lackey,
Normative Science, 82 TERRA 36 (2013). On the prevalence of advocacy in scientific research related to species
conservation, see J. Michael Scott, et al., Policy Advocacy in Science: Prevalence, Perspectives and Implications for
Conservation Biologists, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 29 (2007).
55

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1038.

56

See Wagner, supra note __, at 1661-67.

DRAFT– Not for Citation

Adler – Species Science Charade
Page 13

substituting their views for those of expert agencies delegated authority to assess scientific or
technical matters. Consequently, the deference agencies receive for scientific determinations
often exceeds the generous degree of deference provided in administrative law.
Under Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 57 agencies
receive what is often termed “super deference.” 58 As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained for
a unanimous Court, when considering a challenge to an agency’s scientific judgment “within its
area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science . . . a reviewing court must generally be at its
most deferential. 59 Such deference is to be even greater than that provided an agency’s “simple
findings of fact,” 60 and such deference is not to be diminished by the existence of scientific
uncertainty. 61
Although Wagner’s focus was toxic risk regulation, such as that administered by the
Environmental Protection Agency, her basic critique is quite applicable to species conservation
efforts under the ESA administered by the FWS. As with toxic risk regulation, current scientific
research cannot answer every relevant question with absolute certainty. Assumptions and
premises adopted for normative or other reasons must help fill the gaps, resolve uncertainties,
and produce recommendations for action. Nonetheless, relevant questions and determinations,
including those driven by policy concerns, are often presented or perceived as purely objective

57

462 U.S. 87 (1983).

58

See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession and Judicial Review as Translation of
Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733 (2011).

59

Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 103.

60

Id.

61

Id. at 97.
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scientific matters. 62 In the process, accountability and transparency for normative policy
judgments is obscured. By appealing to scientific authority policymakers are able to escape
responsibility for their policy decisions. 63 By presenting policy choices as “scientific,”
potentially controversial policy choices are perceived as more legitimate by the lay public. 64
The imposition of regulatory constraints on economically productive activity necessarily
creates winners and losers. Environmental advocates may cheer regulations that restrict the use
of toxic chemicals or prevent the development of species habitat, while regulated industries may
decry such measures and the costs they impose. 65 Choosing a side necessarily risks alienating
one side of the issue. Embracing the “science charade” offers a way out of this dilemma for
policymakers, as they may insist that a given policy measure is dictated by science, instead of
their own policy preferences. 66

62

See Meazell, supra note __, at 736 (“interested parties and agencies alike are incentivized to cloak their policy
choices in the seemingly unassailable mantle of science.”).

63

See Michael S. Carolan, The Politics in Environmental Science: The Endangered Species Act and the Preble’s
Mouse Controversy, 17 ENVTL. POLITICS 449. 449 (2008).

64

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1038 (“Decisions attributed to science gain instant legitimacy through
science’s image as a pursuit above the concerns of the partisan political world.”); Cary Coglianese & Gary E.
Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2004)
(“Science has considerable rhetorical appeal when it comes to defending regulatory decisions, as it is often described
and perceived as being ‘objective.”’).

65

In reality, conflicts over regulation are usually more complicated than environmentalists on one side and industry
on the other. In many instances, some industry groups benefit from the imposition of regulations because such
measures may suppress competition or create a comparative advantage. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean
Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM (Terry Anderson
ed., 2000); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TULANE L. REV. 845 (1999); ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS,
PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith Jr. eds., 1992).
66

Wagner, supra note __, at 1651 (“no rational agency or administrative official acting in her own self-interest
would expose the underlying policy choices when faced with the numerous benefits of engaging in the science
charade and the high price for proceeding any other way.”).
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The complex nature of many environmental policy decisions may make it more difficult
for a rationally ignorant lay public to understand the role that science does—or does not—play in
particular decisions. 67 This problem is compounded by the tendency of scientists themselves to
obscure the limits of scientific determinations. 68 As Wagner noted, “scientists have been shown
to deliberately misidentify the hazy line between science and policy.” 69 This occurs both when
scientists and policy experts fail to identify or disclose the limits of existing scientific research,
as well as when scientific researchers fail to disclose the choices they have made to address
underlying uncertainties or the limits of existing research. 70
In some cases, the charade may be deliberate, as when a scientific expert is playing the
role of policy advocate, seeking to advance her own policy preferences. 71 In other cases, it may
be the charade results from the incentives created the underlying legal and policy framework.
Insofar as some statutes mandate that specific regulatory or other actions follow from predicate
scientific determinations – such as a requirement that the FWS must take specified actions once a
species is classified as “endangered” -- the “science charade” may be inevitable

67

On rational ignorance in the electorate, see ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013).
68

See Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 111 (“When regulators and scientists debate policy issues in scientific
language that is not easily accessible, they make it harder for the lay public to participate meaningfully in debates
and hold decision-makers accountable for choices that ultimate turn on values, not complex science.”).

69

See Wagner, supra note __, at 1628. See also Edward J. Rykiel, Scientific Objectivity, Value Systems, and
Policymaking, 51 BIOSCIENCE 433, 434 (2001) (“Scientists typically portray the information they provide to the
public as objective and value free, with the implication that those traits confer greater weight to their opinions than
should be accorded to the value laden opinions of nonscientists.”).

70

See Wagner, supra note __, at 1629 (“Agency scientists and bureaucrats engage in a ‘science charade’ by failing
first to identify the major interstices left by science . . and second to reveal the policy choices they made to fill each
trans-scientific gap.”).

71

On scientists as policy advocates, see generally PIELKE, supra note __.
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ENDANGERED SCIENCE

In 1998, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) listed the Preble’s meadow jumping
mouse as a “threatened species” under the Endangered Species Act. 72 This listing, and the
subsequent designation of over 31,000 acres as critical habitat for the species, imposed
substantial economic costs on local communities. 73 In 2003, a scientific report challenged the
FWS determination that the mouse was a distinct subspecies. 74 Although some questions were
raised about this research, the FWS opted to consider delisting the species, to the relief of some
local government officials and landowners, but to the consternation of environmentalist groups. 75
Some of the former sought to have the mouse delisted, alleging that the mouse was neither

72

See Final Rule to List the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse as a Threatened Species, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,517, 26,526
(May 13, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).

73
See David Holthouse, Building a Better Mousetrap, WESTWORLD, Jan. 20, 2005 (“The federal Fish & Wildlife
Service estimates that protecting Preble’s habitat has cost real-estate developers in Colorado and Wyoming between
$8 million and $18 million every year in consulting fees alone.”); see also Michael S. Carolan, The Politics in
Environmental Science: The Endangered Species Act and the Preble’s Mouse Controversy, 17 ENVTL. POLITICS
449. 451 (2008) (detailing the conflict); Berry J. Brosi & Eric G. Biber, Statistical Inference, Type II Error and
Decision Making under the US Endangered Species Act, 7 FRONTIERS IN ECOL. & ENV. 487, 488 (2009) (noting the
listing decision received attention “because protection of this animal has impacted development in a rapidly growing
region”).
74

See R.J. Ramey, et al., Genetic Relatedness of the Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei) to
Nearby Species of Z. Hudsonius as Inferred from Variation in Cranial Morphology, Mitochondrial DNA, and
Microsatellite DNA: Implications for Taxonomy and Conservation, 8 ANIMAL CONSERVATION 329 (2005).

75

See 12–Month Finding on a Petition to Delist the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei )
and Proposed Delisting of the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse, 70 Fed. Reg. 5,404 (Feb. 2, 2005)

DRAFT– Not for Citation

Adler – Species Science Charade
Page 17

threatened, nor a distinct subspecies. 76 Debate over the mouse’s taxonomic status and need for
protection intensified, prompting the FWS to commission additional research. 77
The legal and scientific fight over the mouse were just beginning. In 2007, the Solicitor
of the United States Department of the Interior issued a legal opinion reinterpreting the meaning
of the phrase “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range” as used
in the ESA. Under this new interpretation, “range” was to be limited to those areas in which a
species is still extant, not a species historic range. Upon the basis of this interpretation, the FWS
in 2008 then delisted the mouse as threatened in Wyoming, but not Colorado. 78 Environmentalist
groups successfully challenged both the Interior Solicitor’s opinion 79 and the FWS decision, 80
and the mouse’s listing was restored – at least for the time being. 81 Additional research published
in 2013 again cast doubt on whether the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse should be considered a

76
90–Day Finding for Petition to Delist the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse in Colorado and Wyoming and
Initiation of a 5–Year Review, 69 Fed.Reg. 16,944, 16,945 (Mar. 31, 2004).
77

See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Politics and Science in Endangered Species Act Listing Decisions, in INSTITUTIONS
109 (Jason Scott Johnson ed. 2012).

AND INCENTIVES IN REGULATORY SCIENCE
78

See Final Rule to Amend the Listing for the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse (Zapus hudsonius preblei) to
Specify over What Portion of Its Range the Subspecies Is Threatened, 73 Fed. Reg. 39790 (July 10, 2008); Center
for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 711 F.Supp.2d 1267 (D. Colo. 2010).

79

See Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D.Mont.2010); WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 2010
WL 3895682 (D.Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010).

80

81

See Center for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 795 F.Supp.2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2011).

In 2013, the FWS also reviewed the prior delisting petitions and concluded that the mouse should retain its listing.
See 12-Month Finding on Two Petitions to Delist the Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse, 78 Fed. Reg. 31680 (May
24, 2013).
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distinct subspecies. 82 Based upon this research, in 2017 the Pacific Legal Foundation filed a new
desilting petition on behalf of “sound science and property rights advocates.” 83
ESA critics charged that the FWS decision to list the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse in
the first place was an example of “junk science.” 84 “The Preble’s meadow jumping mouse is a
perfect example of how getting the science wrong has lasting, real-life implications for
landowners and ultimately the species itself,” commented one opponent of the listing. 85
Supporters of ESA protection of the mouse lodged similar criticisms at those who attacked the
listing, declaring that “good science” justified listing the mouse under the Act. 86 Both opponents
and supporters of the listing claimed that “science” was on their side. Yet the heart of the dispute
over the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse was not a question of science. Scientists disputed
whether the mouse should be considered a distinct subspecies, to be sure, but the political and
legal fight over the mouse was about policy. Neither supporters nor opponents of listing the
Preble’s meadow jumping mouse had principled commitments to a particular approach to
classifying subspecies. Rather, the rhetoric of science was used to mask substantive

82

See Jason L. Malaney & Joseph A. Cook, Using Biogeographical History to Inform Conservation: The Case of
Preble's Meadow Jumping Mouse, 22 MOLECULAR ECOLOGY 6000 (2013).

83

See Damien M. Schiff, The Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse Should Be Delisted, PLF Liberty Blog, Mar. 30,
2017, http://blog.pacificlegal.org/prebles-meadow-jumping-mouse-delisted/.

84

See Carolan, supra note __, at 452 (quoting Rep. Barbara Cubin (R-WY) on how “This entire episode highlights
the problems of junk science with the Endangered Species Act); see also Vincent Carroll, Vindication on Preble’s
Meadow Jumping Mouse, DENVER POST (Oct. 24, 2013).
85

See PLF and Property Rights Groups Petition Feds for Preble’s Mouse Delisting, Mar. 30, 2017,
https://www.pacificlegal.org/release-3-30-17-prebles-mouse-1-1506 (comments of Terry Fankhauser, Executive
Vice President, Colorado Cattlemen’s Association).
86

See Sylvia Fallon, Groundhog’s Day for the Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse? (Dec. 11, 2013),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/sylvia-fallon/groundhogs-day-prebles-meadow-jumping-mouse; see also Holthouse,
supra note __ (quoting environmental activists accusing a scientist skeptical of the mouse’s listing of “politicizing
what is supposed to be an objective scientific process”).
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disagreements over species conservation policy and, in this particular case, whether existing and
potential threats to the existence of the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse in particular parts of the
country justified the imposition of potentially costly regulatory measures.
The fight over the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse encapsulates how the rhetoric of
science is used as a weapon in fights over species conservation policy. It illustrates how the
“science charade” Professor Wagner described in the context of toxic risk regulation also occurs
in species conservation under the ESA. Indeed, in some respects the charade is written into the
law itself. 87
The conclusion that a species is “endangered” in all or a part of its range triggers
regulatory constraints on economic activity. This means the most effective means to influence
ESA regulation is to influence the decision whether or not to list a species as endangered.
Although it is possible to obtain case-by-case regulatory exemptions, as with incidental take
permits, even this process may be costly. For most of those affected by the ESA’s regulatory
burdens, there is relatively little ability to influence agency action once listing decisions have
been made. Similarly, if an environmentalist group wishes to use the ESA to chill development,
the purportedly scientific listing decision is the best place for it to focus its efforts.
In this way the ESA funnels efforts to influence regulatory decision-making toward the
listing process and creates massive incentives to influence how listing decisions are made.
Efforts to advance normative or interest-driven policy preferences must be advanced through
scientific debates over whether species merit listing. At the same time, the ESA’s “best available
science” mandate itself masks policy-driven judgments about how species should be classified

87

See Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 100 (“the Act promotes a ‘science charade.’”).
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and threats to species survival should be identified. The combination is a pervasive science
charade throughout the ESA drama.

A. Science under Pressure

In theory, the addition of an imperiled species to the list of endangered and threatened
species should be a relatively routine matter driven by scientific considerations. The reality is
quite different. A proposal to list a species often signals the onset of fierce political and
administrative battles in which true scientific concerns are subordinated to policy objectives, as
occurred with the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse. 88 One reason for this is that the scientific
determination that a given species is threatened or endangered triggers non-discretionary
regulatory requirements. Under the ESA, the surest way to control a policy outcome is to control
the science. Activists on all sides recognize this fact, which is why activists spend so much time
trying to influence the scientific conclusions. 89
Property owners who own potential habitat for a given species are likely to oppose listing
of the species so as to prevent regulation of their land. 90 Environmental activists are likely to

88

Another prominent example of interest group efforts to influence scientific conclusions for the purpose of
influencing regulatory outcomes is the fight over the listing of the Alabama sturgeon. See, e.g., Ray Vaughan, State
of Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart
Protection for Rare Species, 46 ALA. L. REV. 569 (1995) (discussing opposition to listing of Alabama sturgeon).

89

At the same time, this structure “invit[es] scientists to become advocates for or against species protection . . .
taking them away from their core expertise.” Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 100.
90

See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L
REV. 315, 350 (1997). Writing in Conservation Biology, a group of wildlife biologists observed that “the regulatory
approach to conserving endangered species and diminishing habitats has created anti-conservation sentiment among
many private landowners who view endangered species as economic liabilities.”See Martin B. Main, Fritz M. Roka,
& Reed F. Noss, Evaluating Costs of Conservation, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1263 (1999).
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take the opposite view. As theory would predict, interest group efforts to influence species
listings appears to increase along with the economic stakes involved. 91 At the extreme, this has
produced incentives to manipulate the scientific evidence supporting species listing. 92 During the
Bush Administration, environmentalist groups alleged that Interior Department officials
manipulated the findings of scientific reports at the expense of regulatory protections for
species. 93 Unsurprisingly, interest group activity appears to influence how quickly species move
through the ESA listing process. 94
It is not always necessary to alter scientific conclusions to affect a listing decision or
reduce the costs listing may impose on regulated entities. Delay in the listing of a species,
perhaps due to legal or administrative disputes over the meaning of relevant scientific research,
can benefit those landowners and economic interests would have borne the costs of the ESA’s
regulatory limitations. At the same time, it can be harmful to conservation. 95 Delay in listing a
species increases the opportunity for landowners to respond to the perverse incentives created by
the Act by eliminating potential habitat before the species that rely upon it are listed. 96

91

See Amy Whritenour Ando, Economies of Scope in Endangered-Species Protection: Evidence from Interest
Group Behavior, 41 J. ENVTL ECON. & MGMT. 312 (2001); see also Amy Whritenour Ando, Do Interest Groups
Compete? An Application to Endangered Species, 114 PUBLIC CHOICE 137 (2003) (finding interest group
involvement in species listings increases with the expected costs and benefits of such listings).
92

See, e.g., Corn, et al., supra note __.

93

Id. at 8-9.

94

See Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to Be Protected under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy
of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29, 52 (1999).

95

See Ando, Waiting, supra note __, at 34 (“Long delay in the addition of a species to the endangered species list
can reduce the likelihood that the species will escape extinction; species have even been thought to have become
extinct while waiting for final action from the agency. Thus, delay diminishes the benefits of a listing. It also
reduces the costs.”).

96

Several studies have indicated that landowners engage in preemptive habitat destruction to avoid ESA regulation.
See Dean Lueck & Jeffrey Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J. L. &.
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Because listing a species can have such significant regulatory effects, groups opposing
environmentally harmful development, such as environmentalist groups, have an incentive to
identify potentially endangered species in areas where such development threatens to occur.
Andy Stahl of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund acknowledged that “the ultimate goal” of
environmentalist litigation to list the northern spotted owl was “to delay the harvest of old
growth forests so as to give Congress a chance to provide specific statutory protection for those
forests.” 97 According to Stahl, the owl was a “surrogate” that could ensure “protection for the
forests” under the ESA. 98 The spotted owl litigation was not without its environmental costs,
however. In order to respond to environmentalist lawsuits, the FWS was forced to divert
resources from more pressing needs, compromising overall recovery efforts. 99 This does not
appear to be an isolated instance, as the pattern of environmentalist litigation challenging FWS
listing decisions does not appear to align with species conservation priorities.
The use of scientific findings as a trigger for regulation may also compromise the ability
to obtain better scientific information about the threats posed to endangered species, particularly
on private land. The threat of land-use regulation discourages private landowners from
disclosing information and cooperating with scientific research on their land, further

ECON 27 (2003); Daowei Zhang, Endangered Species and Timber Harvesting: The Case of Red-Cockaded
Woodpeckers, 32 ECON. INQ. 150 (2004); Amara Brook et al., Landowners’ Responses to an Endangered Species
Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (2003). For a
broader discussion of these studies and other research, see Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse
Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated Land-Use Controls, 49 BOST. COLL. L. REV. 301, 313-37 (2008).
97
Quoted in Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and
Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 1, 53, n335 (1993).
98

99

Id.

See Marco Restani and John M. Marzluff, Funding Extinction? Biological Needs and Political Realities in the
Allocation of Resources to Endangered Species Recovery, 52 BIOSCIENCE 169, 175 (2002).
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compromising species conservation efforts. 100 Some landowners fear that the discovery of
endangered or threatened species populations will lead to the imposition of regulatory
controls. 101 Perhaps as a consequence, most research on endangered species occurs on
government land, despite the importance of private land for species preservation. 102 This can
have broad consequences due to the importance of private land for species conservation. 103
With so much at stake when a species is listed, it is no surprise that the scientific integrity
of the listing process experiences enormous pressure. The ESA requires that decisions to list
endangered and threatened species should be determined by the “best available” scientific
evidence. Yet there is ample empirical evidence that political and other non-scientific factors
influence listing decisions. 104 This should not surprise. Listing decisions can force the federal

100
See Stephen Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land with
Imperfect Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 22, 41 (1998);
101

See Jodi Hilty & Adina M. Merenlender, Studying Biodiversity on Private Lands, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
132, 136 (2003); Vicoria J. Dreitz & Fritz L. Knopf, Mountain Plovers and the Politics of Research on Private
Lands, 57 BIOSCIENCE 681, 681 (2007); Amara Brook, Michaela Zint & Raymond De Young, Landowners'
Responses to an Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638, 1638 (2003)..
102

See Hilty & Merenlender, supra note __, at 133.

103
Among other things, “a private landowner might be the only individual who knows a listed species is on his or
her land.” See Jason F. Shogren, Rodney B. W. Smith, & John Tschirhart, The Role of Private Information in
Designing Conservation Incentives for Property Owners, in SPECIES AT RISK: USING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO
SHELTER ENDANGERED SPECIES ON PRIVATE LANDS 217 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 2005); see also James Salzman,
Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services, 80 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. REV. 916 (2005) (noting information asymmetry
between government regulators and private landowners); David S. Wilcove & Joon Lee, Using Economic and
Regulatory Incentives to Restore Endangered Species: Lessons Learned from Three New Programs, 18
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 639, 640 (2004) (noting likely underestimate of endangered species on private land due to
“the reluctance of many private landowners to cooperate with surveys for endangered species”).
104
Ferraro, McIntosh & Ospina, supra note __, at 246; Bonnie Harllee, Myungsup Kim, and Michael Nieswiadomy,
Political Influence on Historical ESA Listings by State: A Count Data Analysis, 140 PUBLIC CHOICE 21 (2009).
Harllee, et al. survey the relevant academic literature at 23-24.

There is also evidence that non-scientific criteria influences which species are studied and how
conservation resources are allocated. See, e.g., Morgan J. Trimble & Rudi J. Van Aarde, Species Inequality in
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government to adopt various regulatory measures with significant economic consequences. With
so much at stake, it would be surprising if political and other factors did not influence listing
decisions.

B. Statutory Charade

The ESA dictates that the decision whether to list a species as endangered or threatened is
supposed to be a purely scientific decision. Section 4 of the Act requires that the decision be
based “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available” 105 Yet in many
respects, this is an impossible standard to meet. 106 As Professor Wyman notes, “decisions to list
and delist species cannot, and are not, determined solely by science without input from policy
considerations.” 107 As a consequence, ESA listing decisions necessarily embody the science
charade in species conservation. Indeed, the science charade is written into the Act. 108
For a given organism to qualify as an “endangered species” under the ESA, the FWS
must conclude both that it is a “species” as defined by the Act (which, as noted above, need not

Scientific Study, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 886 (2010); Andrew Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Patterns of
Behavior in Endangered Species Preservation, 72 LAND ECON. 1 (1996).
105

See 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(1) (emphasis added).

106
Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1035 (“Congress has forced the listing of species into a ‘science charade,’ in
which they must pretend to make non-scientific decisions entirely on the basis of science.”).
107

108

Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 99.

As Professor Doremus notes, “the ESA’s current requirement that listing decisions rest solely on science . . . has
forced the listing agencies into a ‘science charade,’ in which they must pretend to make non-scientific decisions
entirely on the basis of science.” See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1035.
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mean that is actually a separate species, as opposed to a subspecies or distinct population 109), as
well as that it is endangered. Neither of these determinations is purely scientific. 110 As a
consequence, “science often will be unable to determine whether a population of organisms is a
species as defined in the Act.” 111
“Species” is defined to include species, subspecies and distinct populations. 112 This
definition, though expansive, is “singularly uninformative.” As Professor Doremus notes, “[i]t is
merely a list masquerading as a definition.” 113 It provides little guidance as to what constitutes a
distinct species or subspecies, or what makes a population segment “distinct.” Insofar as this
language is ambiguous, it delegates authority to the FWS to clarify the scope of what can, or
cannot, be listed. 114 Such a grant of interpretive authority does not confine the FWS to scientific
considerations, however. Rather, it expressly empowers the agency to make policy judgments.
Determining what constitutes a separate and distinct species or subspecies is not as
simple as a non-scientist might think. There is substantial disagreement over how to define a
species as a taxonomic unit. Literature surveys have found over two-dozen different concepts for

109

See infra notes __ and accompanying text.

110

See Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 102 (“Neither the taxonomic decision nor the risk assessment underlying
a listing decision is a purely scientific exercise.”); Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1088 (“both prongs of the
listing decision force the agencies to look beyond scientific information.”).
111

See Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 102.

112

16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (“The term “species” includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct
population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.”).
113

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1089.

114

See Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
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how to define a species. 115 Even if one focuses simply on a small set of factors, such as genetic
variance or a degree of reproductive isolation, there is no universally accepted rule for how
species should be defined. 116 By some accounts, “there are no ‘rules’ in taxonomy as to what
constitutes a species (or subspecies), nor consistently applied thresholds for defining them within
or across different kinds of organisms.” 117
That the ESA authorizes – indeed, compels – listing subspecies and distinct population
segments as endangered and threatened species introduces further opportunities for normative
judgements to influence purportedly scientific outcomes. If it is hard to define what qualifies as a
distinct species, determining what constitutes a subspecies is even more difficult. 118 When it
comes to determining what is a “distinct population segment,” the lines are fuzzier still. Indeed, a
distinct population segment “is not a scientific concept,” and is quite malleable in application. 119
As commonly defined, “the distinct population segment combines a biological description of the
relationships [among species population] with a clear value judgment as to whether a population
is important.” 120 As with defining what constitutes a species or subspecies, science has an

115

See Carolan, Politics, supra note __, at 453; see also Jason Scott Johnston, Introduction, in INSTITUTIONS AND
INCENTIVES IN REGULATORY SCIENCE 7 (Jason Scott Johnston ed. 2012).
116

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1099 (“What degree of reproductive isolation would justify recognition
of a distinct species cannot be answered on any objective, universally-applicable basis.”).
117

See Rob Roy Ramey, On the Origin of Specious Species, in INSTITUTIONS AND INCENTIVES IN REGULATORY
SCIENCE 84 (Jason Scott Johnston ed. 2012).
118
See Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 103 (“Science provides even less guidance on what counts as a subspecies
than a species because there is little agreement on the degree of differentiation required for a population to count as
a separate subspecies.”).
119

See Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 516.

120

See Emma Marris, The Species and the Specious, 446 NATURE 250, 252 (2007).
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essential role to play in this inquiry, but the ultimate judgment does not represent a purely
scientific conclusion.
In the context of delineating species, the lack of a single, universally accepted set of
taxonomic criteria leaves researchers to make value judgments – judgments about whether it is
better to err on the side of differentiating two organisms or not. 121 “The choice is one of
convenience, usefulness for a specific purpose, or aesthetic judgment, not the objective, universal
sort of determination of the public expects from ‘science,’” notes professor Doremus. 122
What degree of genetic difference or reproductive isolation is required for two organism
populations to be considered two separate species or subspecies? Such choices are also not made
behind a veil of ignorance as to their likely effects. Given the existence of the ESA, the decision
to err on the side of differentiating species, subspecies and distinct populations will, on the
whole, lead to a greater number of species listings, triggering ever more regulation. The valuebased choice as to whether to err on the side of greater differentiation is not made in a vacuum,
but in full view of the practical policy consequences such a choice will have. 123
The science charade is arguably even greater when it comes to determining what
constitutes an “endangered” or “threatened” species. Here the Act expressly prohibits the FWS
from relying upon anything other than the “best scientific and commercial data available.” 124 Yet

121

See Carolan, Politics, supra note __, at 451.

122

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1100.

123

See, e.g., STEVEN LEWIS YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
76 (1982). Yaffee quotes a biologist pointing out that the more organisms are differentiated, “the more protection
you end up with.” Id.
124

See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (b) (“The Secretary shall make determinations required by subsection (a)(1) solely on the
basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to him after conducting a review of the status of the
species. . .”(emphasis added)).
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the terms “endangered” and “threatened,” though defined in the Act, are not scientifically
determinate either. 125
In order to determine that a given species is “in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range,” one has to determine what constitutes a meaningful “danger,” as
well as what constitutes a “significant portion” of the species’ range. These determinations
necessarily involve assessing risks and making value judgments about how to evaluate threats.
After all, all species face some threat of extinction, however remote. 126 In this respect, the
judgment is not particularly different than ones that must be made by other environmental
agencies. 127 Here again, science has an essential role to play in helping to identify and quantify
potential risks to species. Yet science alone is not capable of determining whether a species is
endangered. 128 Ultimately, FWS must make a policy judgment as to how precautionary it
chooses to be in defining and applying the relative terms. In pretending to make such

125

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1117 (“Like ‘species,’ the terms ‘endangered’ and ‘threatened’ cannot be
defined strictly on the basis of scientific information as that term is understood by the public, scientists and the
legislature”). At least one judge has recognized this fact. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d
1207, 1210 (D.Mont. 2010) (“it is not necessarily the case that threatened or endangered status can be determined
solely on the basis of scientific evidence alone. Beyond the question of risk is the issue of the acceptability of risk.”).
126

See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1113 (“Since all species face some finite risk of extinction, all would
appear to merit protection unless some additional content is given to the statutory terms.”).
127

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate emissions of pollutants
that, in the “judgment” of the EPA Administrator, “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”).
128

See Michael S. Carolan, Is It a Distinct Subspecies? Preble’s Mouse and the ‘Best Available Science’ Mandate of
the Endangered Species Act, 21 SOCIETY & NAT. RES. 944, 947 (2008)( “deciding when a species is safe versus
endangered (and this in need of protection) is really a question of how much risk a society is willing to take with that
species. And since there is no ‘correct’ level of risk, such decisions rest upon policy rather than scientific choices.”);
see also Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1035(, “science alone cannot answer all the relevant questions. Science
cannot tell us whether a group of organisms has value to society, or what risk of extinction society should tolerate.”)
.
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determinations on a purely scientific basis – in accordance with the ESA’s requirements – the
FWS engages in the science charade. 129

IV.

THE CHARADE OF ESA SCIENCE REFORM

Just as the ESA submerges normative policy judgments under a veneer of scientific
decision-making, those seeking ESA reform – and their opponents – routinely characterize their
position as a defense of “sound science.” Over the past twenty years, members of Congress have
introduced dozens of ESA reform proposals that purport to address the problem of “junk
science” in species listing and critical habitat designations. 130 These reforms purport to solve
some of the ESA’s problems by mandating the consideration of additional information, such as
research or data provided by state and local governments, imposing additional procedural
requirements, such as peer review, or otherwise mandating measures to increase “transparency”
or “accountability.”
The various science-oriented reforms of the ESA are themselves examples of the science
charade in species conservation. Whether good or bad, many of these reforms don the mantle of
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See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1122 (“Rather than freeing these decisions from political influences, the
strictly science mandate has helped the agencies hide the impact of those influences.”).
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See Jimmy Tobias, The Endangered Species Act Gets Some New Scietnific Armor, PACIFIC STANDARD, Sept. 19,
2016, https://psmag.com/news/the-endangered-species-act-gets-some-new-scientific-armor (“During the 114th
Congress alone, Republicans have introduced more than 100 bills and legislative maneuvers meant to erode the
scientific integrity of the Endangered Species Act.”). For an index of ESA reform bills, see Center for Biological
Diversity, “Attacks on the Endangered Species Act,”
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/table.html.

DRAFT– Not for Citation

Adler – Species Science Charade
Page 30

science, when they are really about something else. 131 What is controversial about the ESA is
not that species are listed on “bad science,” but that environmental activists and progressive
administrations tend to prefer a more precautionary and pro-regulatory approach to species
conservation than do many industries and anti-regulatory administrations. Some would prefer to
err on the side of assuming a species is in greater danger of extinction than it may be, and
adopting protective regulatory measures as a precaution. Others take the opposite view. Yet as
scientific determinations, such as the decision to list a particular species, is what drives the
ESA’s regulatory measures, science is where reform efforts often focus, and the underlying
differences on normative policy questions (such as how precautionary species conservation
regulations should be) are submerged.
Were a member of Congress to argue that precautionary regulation to help conserve
endangered species was unwarranted, or that relieving local economies of regulatory burdens is
is preferable to increase the risk that some species disappear from certain parts of the country if
not go extinct altogether, this position would necessarily risk alienating important political
constituencies. By instead calling for “sound science,” those urging reform can engage in the
charade of advancing a more neutral value – scientific policymaking.
Those criticizing contemporary reform proposals likewise seek to cloak their positions in
the mantle of science. Former Representative John Dingell, who is often credited with authoring
the ESA, told an interviewer that “[t]he ESA was written so that scientific principles would be
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See Meazell, supra note __, at 736 (“Calls for ‘good’ or ‘improved’ science in agencies are often motivated by
the desire to change policy outcomes rather than agencies' use of flawed science in reaching them.”).
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used to protect species. Science would make the decisions, science would decide the case.” 132
According to Dingell, those who wish to reduce the ESA’s regulatory burdens are “a bunch of
antiscience ignoramuses.” 133 The editorial board of the New York Times echoed this view, albeit
in less inflammatory tones, declaring that the ESA’s “purpose is to base protections on
science.” 134 According to the Times, a Congressional decision to delist a population of gray
wolves, so as to relieve local communities of associated regulatory burdens, represented the
triumph of politics over science. 135
Although Section 4 requires that listing decisions are made on the “best available”
scientific information, this information is inevitably incomplete. 136 Subsequent research will
often challenge the assumptions upon which a listing decision was made, such as when it is
discovered that a species is more abundant than initially believed or researchers urge the revision
of a taxonomic classification. This does not mean that the science upon which such decisions are
made is “junk” or inadequate. Indeed, the very language of the ESA, in particular the “best
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Quoted in Christopher Ketcham, Inside the Effort to Kill Protections for Endangered Animals, NATL GEO., May
19, 2017, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/05/endangered_speciesact/.
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Quoted in Christopher Ketcham, Inside the Effort to Kill Protections for Endangered Animals, NATL GEO., May
19, 2017, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/05/endangered_speciesact/.
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A Hole in the Endangered Species Act (editorial), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011.
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As Professor Wyman notes, “it is difficult to maintain” that this action was “the first time that politics has
influenced which species are protected under the Act.” Wyman, Politics, supra note __, at 99.
136

See Murphy & Weiland, supra note __, at 5 (“The wildlife agencies rarely, if ever, have the data and analyses
that believe are sufficient to make fully informed decisions regarding at-risk species in natural systems.”).
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available science” requirement, implicitly acknowledges that ESA determinations will
sometimes be based upon weak or incomplete evidence. 137
The Act’s emphasis on the best available science necessarily allows for listings to occur
based upon incomplete information. 138 Whereas some environmental statutes require agencies to
make a threshold finding based upon some minimum of evidence, the ESA adopts a more
precautionary posture, dictating that listing decisions should be made upon what science and
information is available, whether or not it is comprehensive or reliable. 139 This is not
unscientific. Rather it reflects the fact that those species that are most imperiled will often be
those about which the least is known. 140 For good or ill, this standard reflects a normative
judgment on the part of Congress that listings should be somewhat precautionary – that it is
preferable to list a species today, based upon what is known, than to wait for the accumulation of
additional information which may lead to a more accurate judgment.
In some cases, constraining or burdening the use of available scientific data could do
more than constrain regulation. The “best available” requirement means that government
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See Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1075 (“By calling for reliance on the ‘best available’ scientific
information, Congress explicitly recognized that in some circumstances the scientific evidence supporting listing
determinations might be weak.”).

138

Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1035-36 (“Because so little is known about so many disappearing species, the
best available scientific evidence is often highly uncertain.”).
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The precautionary posture of the ESA can also be seen in Section 7, which requires agencies to ensure that their
actions will not jeopardize a listed species. See also Daniel J. McGarvey, Merging Precaution with Sound Science
under the Endangered Species Act, 57 BIOSCIENCE 65 (2007).
140
That this is a rational and defensible approach to listing species does not necessarily mean that it was a conscious
choice by the ESA’s authors. According to Holly Doremus, when the ESA was adopted “[l]egislators offered little
indication of why the felt that consideration of the best available scientific data was important, or what agencies
should do if the available scientific data proved incomplete or equivocal.” See Holly Doremus, Science and
Controversy, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY: CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY IN HUMAN-DOMINATED
LANDSCAPES VOL. 2, 97 (J. Michael Scott, Dale D. Goble & Frank W. Davis eds 2006).
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officials look at the best there is, however good or bad that may be. If, however, the FWS can
only list if the best available data exceeds some predetermined quantitative or qualitative
threshold, this necessarily alters the extent to which listing serves an informational function,
communicating our best assessment of how at risk a species may or may not be. Such reforms
could preclude conservation efforts even where such action would be desirable despite the lack
of greater scientific certainty. Inhibiting the communicative function of the listing process could
also inhibit even non-regulatory and NGO conservation efforts that rely upon the endangered and
threatened lists to help set their conservation priorities. Because science and research the on
rarest species may (necessarily) be more limited, threshold requirements for listing adopted in
the name of science would have greatest effect on rarest species, some of those most in need of
protection
Reforms that require additional procedural steps, such as additional peer review or
specific types of studies or assessments, will serve to delay listing decisions. Insofar as listing a
species (alone, or in combination with program funding 141), such measures could undermine the
ESA’s effectiveness insofar as they delay listing and subsequent conservation efforts. 142
Requiring additional research, peer review, or the accumulation of some minimal quantum of
research before a species could be listed might reduce the number of species delisted due to data
errors, but at the expense of losing species that go extinct awaiting listing. 143
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See infra.
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Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1146 (a statutory peer review requirement would add to the administrative
burdens of listing without noticeably increasing the reliability or accuracy of listing decisions.”).
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See Ruhl, Prescribing, supra note __, at 405 (“What a hollow victory for sound science it would be, for example,
to spend so much time ensuring the reliability of the data proving the species is endangered that the species is
already extinct by the time the decision to protect it is made.”).
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Some commentators suggest that ESA science should be subjected to the standards for
scientific evidence. 144 Specifically, they argue that courts should apply the standards adopted by
the Supreme Court in the “Daubert trilogy” of cases 145 when evaluating the science underlying
agency regulatory decisions. Such proposals could make it easier to challenge ESA
implementation decisions in court, but they would be unlikely to improve the quality of agency
decisionmaking under the ESA. As Professor David Bernstein has explained, the problem that
the Daubert trilogy of cases sought to address – the potential for “junk science” to unduly
influence lay juries in the context of litigation – is quite different from the alleged problems with
the use of science under the ESA. 146 Agencies, unlike juries, are well aware of the limitations of
the scientific methodologies and studies upon which they rely. Insofar as agencies choose to rely
upon incomplete or uncertain scientific conclusions when making regulatory decisions, it is
because they are required to do so under the relevant statutory provisions, or because they have
chosen to exercise their discretion to adopt particular types of policies, such as a more
precautionary or pro-regulatory approach to species conservation.
Many science-oriented reforms are redundant with existing administrative law norms,
such as the requirement that agencies engage in reasoned decisionmaking. 147 Others would

144

See, e.g., J. Tavener Holland, Regulatory Daubert: A Panacea for the Endangered Species Act's "Best Available
Science" Mandate?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 299 (2008). For a broader argument in favor of “regulatory Daubert,”
seeAlan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of
Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7
(2003).
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See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997); Kumho tire Co v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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See David E. Bernstein, What to Do About Federal Agency Science: Some Doubts About Regulatory Daubert, 22
GEO. MASON L. REV. 549 (2015)
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See Ruhl, Prescribing, supra note __, at 401 (“many of the methodological components of science are already
firmly embedded in environmental law through basic standards of administrative law prescribed under the
Administrative Procedure Act”).
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paradoxically make the science charade worse, by further burying the underlying normative
judgments that are necessarily a part of species conservation policy. 148 An inordinate focus on
science also sidelines the more important normative debate about trade-offs and distributional
consequences of competing species conservation strategies. Agencies should be rewarded, not
punished, for greater candor about the normative, discretionary judgments they make when
implementing a complex regulatory statute like the ESA. 149

V.

ENDING THE CHARADE

Escaping the science charade in species conservation requires greater candor about
science’s role identifying and conserving imperiled species. This is unlikely to be achieved by
current reform proposals. It can, however, be aided by reforms that help to clarify the role that
science does – and does not – play in identifying which species are in need of assistance, and
what form such assistance must take. 150
There is no problem with the “best available science” standard insofar as it directs the
FWS to rely upon whatever scientific research and data is available at the time that a listing
decision must be made. Traditional standards of judicial review of agency action, including the
requirement that agencies demonstrate that they engaged in reasoned decisionmaking and
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Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1035 (“Calls for better science simply reinforce the science charade,
exacerbating the problems it has created.”).
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See Ruhl, Prescribing, supra note __, at 404 (“science, even sound science, usually does not lead to compelling
answers about the questions posed in environmental law.”).
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Wagner, supra note __, at 1628 (“if policy decisions are to receive appropriate public scrutiny, science-policy
decisionmakers must be extremely forthright in distinguishing policy judgments from scientific facts.”).
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considered the information and objections in the record, are sufficient. Such standards must be
applied faithfully, however. The proverbial “hard look” must, in fact, be a hard look. Agency
invocation of science should not be enough to invoke the sort of “super-deference” often applied
under Baltimore Gas.
Under traditional administrative law notions of reasoned decision-making, agencies
should be required to be candid and transparent about what science does and does not show.
Agencies should be required to acknowledge their premises and presumptions, as well as the
policy judgments that inform implementation. Contrary to the suggestion of some reformers,
agencies should not be categorically precluded from acting on incomplete or uncertain science. If
the best available data suggests a species is endangered, an agency should not be precluded from
saying so (though what should be done about such a determination is another matter).
Legislative reforms could be adopted to relieve pressure on endangered species science
and reduce the incentive for agencies (and policymakers) to engage in the science charade. In
particular, the listing process should be insulated from political and economic pressure. At
present the ESA’s “protections” are triggered once a species is listed, irrespective of their value
for that particular species. 151 As a consequence, the ESA’s current regulatory structure both
discourages conservation and compromises conservation science.
One possible remedy for this problem, suggested by Professor Wyman is “decoupling”
the listing decision from mandatory conservation measures. 152 This would release the pressure
to manipulate listing decisions and enable federal agencies “to develop protections tailored to the
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Bean, supra note __ , at 373 (noting that species are listed without regard for whether the Act’s prohibitions
“address the threats that imperil a species”).
152

Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 516.
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needs of each species and its circumstances.” At present, however, the ESA’s “protections” are
triggered once a species is listed, irrespective of their value for that particular species.
Decoupling could make species listing decisions less contentious and monumental, and
reduce the time and expense it takes for such decisions to be made. FWS biologists would be
able to focus on getting the science right, and devote less time responding to litigation. While it
would still make sense for listing to trigger a legal obligation for the FWS to develop a
conservation strategy and recovery plan, it would not force the imposition of specific regulatory
controls. This would mean that outside organizations would no longer be able to use endangered
species as a proxy for other battles. As Professor Wyman explains, “One of the advantages of
decoupling the listing of a species from decisions about how it should be protected is that there
should be greater room for developing creative measures tailored to species’ needs and
circumstances.” 153 Such an approach could facilitate the development of more tailored and costeffective conservation strategies for specific species and “might reduce the contentiousness of
listing decisions by reducing the momentousness of listing.” 154
Decoupling could be achieved in multiple ways. The surest way to decouple the listing
decision from regulation would be to completely disarm the trigger. Under such a “hard
decoupling” approach, listing a species as endangered would no longer trigger mandatory
imposition of prohibition on habitat modification. Agencies would have to develop and propose
specific conservation measures for each listed species. In many respects, this would mean
treating endangered species as threatened. A benefit of this approach would be that it would
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Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 519.
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Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 516.
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dramatically reduce the incentive to influence or manipulate listing decisions because no
regulatory consequences would follow automatically from a listing decision. A decision to list a
species would be just that – a decision to include a species (or subspecies, or distinct population)
on a list – and not a de facto decision to impose regulatory constraints on economic activity.
A risk of a “hard decoupling” approach would be that many listed species would languish
and receive no benefit from listing. At present, the FWS often lags in fulfilling its obligation to
designate critical habitat or promulgate recovery plans. Freed of any obligation to take specific
steps, or impose specific regulatory limitations on activities that may harm listed species, it is
possible that the FWS might not act. It is possible that private conservation organizations and
state wildlife agencies would take some steps in response to species listings in the absence of
mandatory federal regulatory response, but unlikely that such efforts would be sufficient.
An alternative would be to adopt a “soft decoupling” approach, such as that suggested by
Professor Wyman, under which existing regulatory restrictions are imposed and maintained on a
temporary basis until the FWS identifies and adopts a more cost-effective conservation strategy
for the species in question. 155

CONCLUSION

Calls for more or “better” science, or greater judicial scrutiny of use of science in ESA
implementation will not address ESA’s underlying problems. 156 Insofar as such reforms increase
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See Wyman, Rethinking, supra note __, at 517.

As Professor Doremus counsels, “policymakers must realize that simply characterizing a question as scientific
does not guarantee an answer which is either objective or reliable.” Doremus, Listing, supra note __, at 1065.
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the time and cost of making decisions and implementing policies they may frustrate conservation
efforts, but without underlying rationale. Delaying the listing of species may be an effective way
to forestall the regulatory costs of species conservation under the ESA, but it does not make for
more effective species conservation, nor does it insulate science from political pressure.
Science has an indispensable role to play in species conservation, as it does in
environmental law more generally. Science is necessary to inform policymakers at all stages of
the policymaking process. Science can help diagnose existing environmental problems, as well
as to identify and evaluate potential solutions. In order for science to perform this role most
effectively, agencies should be encouraged to be candid about what science can and cannot do.
The uncertainties and limitations of existing research must be acknowledged. The normative
premises that shape how science is evaluated and deployed must be exposed. Most importantly,
science should not be used as a shield for normative policy judgments. Engaging in the science
charade encourages science politicization and undermines political accountability, neither of
which is conducive to sound environmental policy.

